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au mythe de la firme globale  
 
Résumé 
Les firmes multinationales émergentes latino-américaines proviennent pour l’essentiel du Brésil, 
du Mexique. Leur motivation principale réside dans l’acquisition de ressources naturelles et la 
recherche de débouchés. A l’exception de Cemex et d’Embraer qui aspirent à être des global 
players, la majorité des translatines sont des firmes régionales ou bi-régionales. L’orientation 
sectorielle des translatines reflète pour une grande part la spécialisation productive et 
technologique de l’Amérique latine. Elles ne disposent pas des mêmes avantages spécifiques que 
les firmes multinationales émergentes asiatiques dans les industries de haute technologie ou 
dans les secteurs à forte intensité capitalistique.  Le  développement récent de leurs activités 
internationales qui s’effectue en parallèle avec l’essor des firmes émergentes asiatiques ne sont 
pas sans conséquence sur la dynamique de l’économie mondiale, en particulier sur la 
reconnexion Nord-Sud et l’approfondissement des relations Sud-Sud. 
Mots-clés : Firmes multinationales émergentes, multilatinas, investissements étrangers 




The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership  
to the myth of the global corporation  
 
Abstract 
The emerging Latin American corporations come essentially from Brazil and Mexico. Their 
prime motivation lies in the acquisition of natural resources and the search for market openings. 
With the exception of Cemex and Embraer who aspire to be global players, the majority of the 
multilatinas are regional or bi-regional companies. To a large extent, the sectorial breakdown of 
the multilatinas reflects the productive and technological specialisation of Latin America. They 
do not have at their disposal the same specific advantages as the emerging Asian multinational 
corporations in the high-tech industries or in the high capital-intensive sectors. The recent 
growth of their international activities has certainly impacted the dynamics of the global 
economy, particularly as regards the re-establishment of North-South links and the 
strengthening of South-South co-operation. 
 
Keywords: Emerging multinational corporations, multilatinas, foreign direct investment, 
re-establishment of North-South links, South-South co-operation   
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Introduction 
The international expansion of companies which originate from developing countries has 
gathered pace since the middle of the 1990s. Foreign direct investment (FDI) from these 
countries increased tenfold between 1990 and 2005; it represents a growing proportion of the 
world stock of FDI (15.8% in 2005 compared with 8.2% in 1990). Even if Asia’s emerging 
multinational corporations are the most active, the large Latin American corporations have 
also emerged as new international players.  
Of the fifty largest multinational corporations from developing countries, in 2005 eight come 
from Latin America. Their head offices are in Mexico (CEMEX, Telmex, América Móvil, 
FEMSA-Fomento Economico Mexicano) in Brazil (Petrobras, Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
(CVRD), Gerdau) and in Venezuela (Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA)). The multilatinas 
specialise principally in exploiting natural resources such as mining activities (CVRD), 
metallurgy (Gerdau, Imsa), hydrocarbons (Petrobras, PDSA) and construction (CEMEX) but 
also in the telecommunications sector (Telmex, América Móvil) and foods and drinks 
(FEMSA-Fomento, Grumba, Bimbo). 
The major Latin American companies started reinforcing their internationalisation process 
during the last decade for a variety of reasons: economic reforms which encouraged an 
opening on to the exterior, privatisation programmes, saturation of domestic markets, the 
desire to conquer neighbouring markets and the need to diversify risk. 
The emergence of multinational corporations originating in developing countries raises 
numerous questions. Do the theoretical fundamentals behind the multinationalisation of 
corporations from Triad companies apply in the same way to companies from emerging 
economies? Do the latter have specific motivations for investing abroad? Do they have global 
or regional strategies? Similarly, it is worth wondering what effect the rapid development of 
these corporations has had on their home country as well as on host countries. Is their impact 
the same as that prompted by multinational corporations from developed countries? What is 
their role in the re-establishment of the North-South link and in South-South cooperation?  
While our objective is not to provide answers to all of these questions, we shall contribute 
elements of response to some of them. Therefore, we shall start by explaining the role played 
by multilatinas in the upsurge of foreign direct investment from emerging economies. The 
second stage will be to examine the fundamentals behind the expansion of Latin American 
multinational corporations.  We shall then analyse the strategic behavioural approach adopted 
by emerging multinationals in Latin America. Lastly, we shall endeavour to identify what 
lessons can be learned from the multinationalisation of the large Latin American corporations, 
particularly as regards North-South economic relations and enhanced South-South co-
operation. The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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I - The role of multilatinas in the expansion of foreign direct 
investment by developing countries 
A - The expansion of foreign direct investment by developing 
countries 
The multinationalisation of companies from developing countries is nothing new, with the 
Argentinian textile company Alpargatas setting up a subsidiary in Uruguay as early as 1890 
(UNCTAD, 2006). Wells (1983) recalls that the Argentinian industrial manufacturer, 
S.I.A.M. di Tella, created a subsidiary in Brazil back in 1928 to produce petrol pumps there. 
However, it was not until the Sixties that foreign direct investment (FDI) by companies from 
developing countries really began to take off.  
Dunning and Narula (1996) as well as Chudnovsky and López (2000) distinguish three waves 
of outward FDI flow from developing countries. The first wave started in Latin America in 
the years 1960-1970. At that time, new multinational corporations
1 emerged from Argentina, 
Mexico, Chile and then from Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela. The FDI outflows 
accompanied the industrialisation strategies of their home countries, based on the substitution 
of imports. The majority of these investments centred on other developing countries, 
particularly neighbouring countries, and concentrated on the extractive industries, civil 
engineering and construction services. They were aimed at the receiving countries’ markets 
and/or the search for natural resources for the home countries. In many cases, these 
investments were also prompted by the desire to circumvent the trade barriers imposed by 
host countries. 
The second wave which began during the 1980s was dominated by Asian multinational 
corporations, particularly those from the Four Little Dragons (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore). Malaysia, Thailand, China, India and the Philippines rapidly joined “the 
Foursome” whereas Latin America paused momentarily. These corporations accompanied the 
industrial strategy of promoting their home country’s exports. Their foreign investments were 
governed by a number of factors: appreciation of local currencies, access to natural resources, 
proximity to customers, search for cheaper labour, access to brand labels and new 
technologies (Whitmore et al., 1989). The FDIs of the emerging Asian economies which were 
more significant than those of the first wave, were directed at sectors which were more 
technologically sophisticated (Chudnovsky and López, 1999). They mainly targeted the other 
emerging economies of the region together with North America and Europe. 
The third wave, initiated during the 1990s, is characterised by a strong surge in the outward 
flow of investment and by renewed activity on the part of Latin American FDI in a context of 
increasing competition on a global scale both in the industrial and service sectors. Andreff 
(2003b) underlines the fact that at that time the major Asian multinational corporations started 
competing with the multinational corporations (MNCs) from developed countries. The Asian 
corporations began investing in developed as well as developing countries and became net 
FDI exporters, a privilege up to then reserved for developed countries.  
                                                 
1 We shall retain the definition of multinational corporations formulated by Dunning (2006: 173): “ … all 
enterprises that engage in FDI and that own or control value-adding activity outside their national boundaries”. 
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With the exception of a few corrections in 1990-1991, 1998 and 2001-2003 the FDI flows 
from developing countries have not ceased to increase since the 1970s. They have moved up 
from an annual average of $4 billion between 1982 and 1986 to more than 117 billion in 
2005, topping  almost 144 billion in 2000 (table 1). Excluding the year 2000 peak, the 
outward flows of FDI from developing countries more than doubled between 1998 and 2005, 
whereas over the same period total world FDI only managed to move up by 13.3 %, also 
experiencing a peak in 2000. The growth of investments outside developing countries went 
hand in hand with an increasing share on their part in the total of world FDI, reaching 15.1% 
in 2005 compared to 6% in 1982.   
 
Table 1. Regional breakdown of outward FDI, 1982-2005 








1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Value at current prices (billions of dollars) 
Developed economies  53,0  183 275,7 631,5  1014,3  1097,5 684,8 485,1 514,8 686,3 646,2 
Developing economies  4,0  12  51,4  53,4 75,5  143,8 76,7 49,7  35,5 112,8 117,5 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
0,01  0,02 1,2 2,3 2,5 3,2  2,7  4,7 10,7 14,0 15,1 
World  57  195 328,2 687,2  1092,3  1244,5 764,2 539,5 561,1 813,1 778,7 
Share in world FDI outflows (%) 
Developed  economies  94  94 84,0 91,9 92,9 88,2 89,6 89,9 91,7 84,4 83,0 
Developing economies  6  6  15,6  7,8  6,9 11,6 10,0  9,2  6,3 13,9 15,1 
Central and Eastern 
Europe 
0,01  0,01 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,9 1,9 1,7 1,9 
World  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
* Annual average 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD (2006) and the FDI/STS database (www.unctad.org/fdstatistics) 
The expansion in outward FDI realised by developing and transition countries brought with it, 
on the part of MNCs from these countries, an increase in international merger and acquisition 
operations. Between 1987 and 2005, the proportion accounted for by these MNCs moved up 
from 4% to 13% in value terms, and from 5% to 17% in the number of operations conducted 
(UNCTAD, 2006). In terms of sectorial activity, the flows were mainly directed at the tertiary 
sector, particularly services to business, commercial and financial services. However the 
flows recorded into the manufacturing sector were by no means insignificant, the electronics 
industry in particular, and more recently in the primary sector (oil exploration and mining).  
B - Latin America’s contribution to outward FDI from developing 
countries 
The geographical composition of FDI coming from developing countries has changed over 
time, with a marked and constant progression of developing Asian countries as a source of 
outward investment. At an annual rate of $18.5 billion between 1990 and 1994, FDI coming 
out of Asia exceeded the 83 billion mark in 2004 and 2005, up 4.5 times over some fifteen 
years (figure 1). Over the same period, the FDI coming out of Latin America multiplied by 
fifteen to stand at $32.8 billion in 2005, while FDI from Africa maintained its very low level, 
as at the outset.  The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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Latin America’s share in the total of developing countries’ outward FDI has fluctuated 
enormously over the last ten years. Standing at about 10% between 1990 and 1994, it rose to 
43% in 2003 before dropping back to around 28% in 2005 (figure 2). Asia’s share has also 
fluctuated, but in the opposite direction, dropping back from its  86.6% level between 1990 
and 1994 to 53.5% in 2003, before climbing back up to 71.2% in 2005. On the other hand, 
Africa’s share which was still high at the beginning of the 1980s (37.5%) has fallen back 
substantially, accounting for barely 1% of developing countries’ outward FDI in 2005.  
Figure 1. Regional breakdown of outward FDI from developing countries, 1980-











1980-1984* 1985-1989* 1990-1994* 1994-1999* 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Africa Latin America Asia
* Annual average 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) and the FDI/STS database 
(www.unctad.org/fdstatistics) 
Figure 2. Share of the regions in the total of outward FDI from developing 
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Africa Latin America Asia
* Annual average 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) and the FDI/STS database 
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In terms of country of origin, outward FDI from developing and transition countries are more 
concentrated than those from developed countries. In 2000, more than 70% of the stock of 
FDI from developing and transition countries came from the top five countries of origin, with 
85.6%  coming from the top ten (table 2). Concentration remained strong in 2005, with the 
relative share held by each of these two groupings standing at 65.8% and 82.3% respectively. 
In the same year, Hong Kong (China), the British Virgin Islands, the Russian Federation, 





th) held, between the four of them, 11% 
of the total stock of FDI outflows. 
 
Table 2. Batting order of the 15 principal developing and transition countries in terms of 
stock of FDI outflows, 2000-2005 
 
2000 2005 
Ranking  Country  Millions of $  Ranking  Country  Millions of $ 
1  Hong Kong, China  388 380  1  Hong Kong, China  470 458 
2  Taiwan  66 655  2  British Virgin 
Islands 
123 167 
3 British  Virgin 
Islands  
64 483  3  Russian Federation  120 417 
4 Singapore  56  766  4 Singapore  110  932 
5  Brazil  51 946  5  Taiwan  97 293 
6  South Africa  32 319  6  Brazil  71 556 
7 China  27  768  7 China  46  311 
8  Republic of Korea   26 863  8  Malaysia  44 480 
9  Malaysia  22 874  9  South Africa  38 503 
10  Argentina  27 141  10  Republic of Korea  36 478 
11  Caiman Islands  20 553  11  Caiman Islands  33 747 
12  Russian Federation  20 141  12  Mexico  28 040 
13  Bermuda  14 942  13  Argentina  22 633 
14 Chile  11  154  14 Chile  31  286 









  1 399 963 
 
Source: UNCTAD data (2006) 
Mainly due to the economic crises, institutional changes and economic policy modifications 
which occurred at different times, these four countries successively shared the leader position 
in Latin America. While Argentina and Chile were the main investor countries during the 
1990s, Brazil and Mexico (the latter only publishing statistics since 2001) have been battling 
for sub-continent supremacy since 2004 (table 3). Brazil regained the top slot as the number 
one investor abroad in 2006, in the wake of a spectacular surge in its outward FDI which 
totalled $28.2 billion, some eleven times its 2005 figure. This record amount which for the 
first time made Brazil a net exporter of FDI, can to a large extent be explained by CVRD’s 
acquisition of Inco, the Canadian mining company for a total of $16.7 billion. (CEPAL, 
2007). However, without the other acquisitions or investments by MNCs such as Itaú, 
Petrobras, Votorantim and Gerdau, Brazilian FDI would never have attained such a historic 
level
2. 
                                                 
2 By comparison, the amount of FDI realised in 2006 by Brazilian emerging multinationals alone was equal to 
the total FDI figure realised by all MNCs of Latin American origin during 2004 The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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Table 3. Net flows of outward FDI of the main Latin American investor countries,  




1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Argentina  1 196  3 653  2 325  1 730  901  161  -627  774  442  1 151  2 008 
Brazil  516  1 042  2 721  1 690  2 282  -2 258  2 482  249  9 807  2 517  28 202 
Chile  726  1 463  1 483  2 558  3 987  1 610  343  1 606  1 527  2 209  2 797 
Colombia  205 809 796 116 325  16 857 938 142  4  662  1  098 
Mexico  0  0  0  0  0  4 404  891  1 253  4 432  6 474  3 897 
Venezuela  400  557  1 043  872  521  204  1 026  1 318  619  1 183   2 089 
Source: CEPAL (2007 
As in Brazil, the increase in FDI outflows from Mexico up until 2005 came essentially from a 
small number of sizeable operations by just a few MNCs in specific sectors such as cement, 
telecommunications, foods and drinks. Hence, the acquisitions by CEMEX of Southdown Inc 
(the second largest American cement manufacturer) in 2000 for $2.8 billion and of the British 
company RMC in 2005 for $5.8 billions explain the uplift in the flows recorded for the years 
in question. Conversely, the relative downturn in 2006 reflects a year where there were no 
large-scale operations and which also marked CEMEX’s withdrawal from Indonesia. Chile, 
which has maintained its position as the number three investor country since 2004, 
concentrates its investments in the retail and mining sectors, particularly targeting other 
countries in the region. Venezuela has held on to its fourth position in the region since 2001 
thanks to the outward investments made by PDVSA in the hydrocarbon sector.   
C - The role played by multilatinas in the emergence of Southern 
multinational corporations  
Even if the number of Triad-origin MNCs still holds majority sway, the share attributable to 
developing country MNCs has been growing significantly these last few years. In 2004, five 
developing country companies, all with their head office in Asia, figured in the batting order 
of the top-100 non-financial MNCs, ranked on the basis of their assets abroad (UNCTAD, 
2006). These five companies - Hutchinson Whampoa (Hong Kong (China)), Petronas 
(Malaysia), Singtel (Singapore), Samsung Electronics (South Korea) and CITIC Group 
(Chine) - constituted the Top 5 MNCs from developing countries. Likewise, the number of 
companies from developing countries listed in the Fortune Global 500 (listing taking all 
sectors into account) increased from 26 in 1988 to 60 in 2005. Sinopec (China) which comes 
in 23
rd position is the highest-ranked company from developing Asia; PDVSA (Venezuela), 
ranked number 35, is the top firm from Latin America based on turnover.  
Asia’s relative dominance is also apparent from the list of the top 50 non-financial MNCs 
from developing countries, occupying 37 of the 50 positions in 2005. Hong Kong with 10 
companies, but also China and Singapore with 7 companies respectively were massively 
represented (table 4). In this listing, Latin America comes out honourably, with a dozen or so 
companies present up to the turn of this century. However, its position has been eroded in 
recent years in favour of South Africa which boasted 5 companies in the top 50 whereas the 
number of Latin American MNCs dropped back to 8 in 2005.   
As table 5 shows, the largest multilatinas, with the exception of PDVSA, all come from 
Mexico and Brazil. This dominance is logical when all is said and done in that, as we saw 
earlier, these countries became the top two countries to invest outside Latin America. While 
the top three Brazilian multilatinas specialise in the extraction of natural resources (oil, The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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mining), the large Mexican multilatinas are more diversified in their business activities. Their 
international operations cover the construction industry and metallurgy, as well as 
telecommunications and transport, even foods and drinks. 
 
Table 4. Home territories of the non-financial MNCs ranked* in the Top 50 MNCs from 
developing countries, 1995-2005 
 
 










Republic of Korea 



















































































Total  50 50 50 
 
* Ranking based asset value abroad 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) 
 
Table 5. The principal Latin American non-financial MNCs, ranked by asset value 
abroad, 2005 (Millions of dollars)  
 
Company  Home country  Industry  Foreign assets  Ranking in the Top 100 
MNCs from developing 
countries  
Cemex S.A.  Mexico  Construction   13 323  6 
PDVSA   Venezuela  Petroleum  8 868  9 
Petrobras Brazil  Petroleum  6  221  12 
Telmex Mexico  Telecommunications 4  734  17 
América Móvil  Mexico  Telecommunications 4  448  18 
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce  Brazil  Mining & quarrying  4 026  25 
Metalurgica Gerdau S.A.  Brazil  Metal   3 358  33 
FEMSA-Fomento Economico 
Mexicano 
Mexico  Food & beverages  2 110  50 
Gruma S.A. De C.V.   Mexico  Food & beverages  1 168  70 
Grupo Bimbo S.A. De C.V.  Mexico  Food & beverages  1 166  71 
Grupo Imsa  Mexico  Metal  934  83 
Cintra Mexico  Transport  716  98 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) 
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II - The fundamentals behind the expansion of Latin 
American multinational corporations  
A - Literature’s contribution 
The first works devoted to developing country MNCs appeared about thirty years ago (Diaz 
Alejandro, 1977; Lecraw, 1977; Lall, 1983; Wells, 1983). They were partly inspired by earlier 
work conducted by authors such as Hymer, Kindleberger, Vernon in the United States or by 
Dunning in Great Britain on the multinationalisation of corporations in developed countries. 
Kindleberger (1969) and Hymer (1976) put the multinationalisation of industrial corporations 
down to the existence of specific advantages that they are able to transfer abroad. Derived 
from market imperfections these specific advantages are diverse in nature: brand image, 
know-how, privileged access to certain markets (capital, raw materials, specialised labour), 
achieving economies of scale and/or of range, legislation encouraging the entry of foreign 
capital. In his product life-cycle theory, Vernon (1966) shows that the innovative company 
loses its technological advantage once its product reaches its stage of maturity. To improve its 
competitiveness, it is tempted to relocate its production into the countries which import its 
product in order to reduce transport costs and to adapt more efficiently to local demand. As 
soon as the product becomes part of everyday life, competitiveness is measured essentially in 
terms of price, hence the search for set-up opportunities in countries where production costs 
can be reduced. As part of this process, the oligopolistic structure of markets may prompt 
“copy-cat” reactions from other corporations who in turn will look at relocation options so as 
to preserve market share on a global scale.   
In the same vein as Coase, Rugman (1981),  Caves (1982) and Casson (1983) use the 
internalisation theory to justify set-ups abroad. They show that it is sometimes in a company’s 
interest to retain some of the functions linked to their international activities in-house, 
particularly if moving abroad drives up transaction costs. In this scenario, transactions are 
conducted between subsidiaries of the same group and not with external companies (sub-
contractors, suppliers, intermediaries …).  
In addition to the corporation’s specific advantages and to those regarding in-house 
operations, Dunning (1977) in his eclectic theory paper puts forward a third advantage, that of 
location. The corporation will invest abroad if the following three factors are simultaneously 
satisfied (the OLI paradigm): Ownership, Location, Internalisation. The first covers specific 
assets which can potentially be exploited profitably on an international scale (patents, brand 
names, product differentiation, human resources, marketing networks …). Location reflects 
the attractivity of certain countries (quality of production factors, labour costs, subsidies, 
country risk.…). Internalisation means that transaction-related costs between independent 
corporations can be obviated hence reducing uncertainty and providing greater control over 
the offer and prospects.   
Following on from these studies, at the end of the 1970s, several authors began to home in on 
the determinants of developing countries’ FDI in order to gain a better understanding of the 
emergence of “Third World Multinationals”, to use the expression coined by Wells (1983). In 
agreement with Andreff (2003b), four analysis frameworks have emerged to explain the FDI 
of developing country companies. The first, formulated by authors such as Lecraw (1977) and 
Wells (1983), views developing country MNCs as acquiring their specific advantages from 
the use of small-scale and low labour-intensive technologies which enable them to compete The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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with developed countries on standardised, easy-price product markets. This advantage is 
linked to the economic conditions in developing countries which are mainly characterised by 
low labour costs and by the existence of small companies that benefit from reduced structure 
costs. 
Lall (1983) moves well away from this approach by showing that the activities in which third 
world MNCs acquire a specific advantage are very diverse and vary from one home country 
to another. He stresses that their key assets come more from their national technological base 
and their operational know-how than from their commercial skills. Unlike Lecraw and Wells, 
he demonstrates that the range of products offered by third world MNCs is quite broad and 
that their advantage does not lie in the use of simple, labour-intensive technologies but in the 
technological developments they have been able to generate from their domestic 
technological base. Lall maintains that it is the characteristics of the home country more than 
the attractivity factors displayed by the host country which prompt developing country 
corporations to invest abroad. 
A third analysis framework endeavours to explain the outward flows of FDI from developing 
countries, particularly from Asian countries, by the development of the industrial structures in 
the emerging economies. Tolentino (1993) shows that emerging country MNCs can develop 
specific technological advantages without having to take on board developed countries’ 
technologies. For Tolentino, several Asian MNCs have divorced themselves either partially or 
totally from foreign technologies and have become genuine, innovative companies in their 
own right, innovative in the Schumpeterian sense of the term. These corporations have 
succeeded in winning their technological independence on the back of the industrial and 
technological development of their home country in which they were stakeholders particularly 
through their on-going impetus in research and development. 
The final approach attempts to pull together the conclusions of the three previous currents by 
integrating them into an overall theory applicable to all MNCs and all FDI. The IDP 
(Investment Development Path) model drawn up by Dunning (1988) suggests that a country’s 
inward and outward FDI flows depend on its level of economic development (as measured by 
per capita GDP). For Dunning, each country is supposed to go through five phases. At the 
pre-industrialisation stage, FDI flows are virtually non-existent because of the country’s low 
level of attractivity and local companies rarely have competitive advantages that they can 
assert abroad. During the second phase, the infancy of industrialisation, the country possesses 
advantages in the labour-intensive sectors, its domestic market expands and it begins to attract 
FDI. At the same time, some outward FDI start to appear but national corporations are not yet 
competitive enough to become fully-fledged MNCs. In the third phase, the newly-developed 
country’s technological competencies grow in stature, domestic demand for more 
sophisticated products increases and the advantages in terms of labour costs progressively 
recede. The economy becomes attractive for inward FDI which increase, albeit at a slower 
rate; outward FDI moves ahead significantly and at an increasing rate particularly on the back 
of local innovations. During the fourth stage, the developed country establishes itself as a net 
FDI exporter and the balance between outward and inward FDI becomes positive for the first 
time. In the last stage, the developed country reaches the post-industrial age, receives 
considerable FDI but is also one of the largest investors abroad. The balance between outward 
and inward FDI can fluctuate either side of the zero mark.  
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B - Identifying home countries’ push factors  
Do the determinants of FDI mentioned earlier apply in the same way to the main Latin 
American investor countries?
3 Taking the example of the domestic factors which determine 
FDI outflows (push factors), we shall show that the existence of common reasons does not 
prevent us looking for factors which are country-specific. 
The home-country factors which push companies to invest abroad fall into four categories: 
market conditions, production costs, local business conditions and governmental policies 
(UNCTAD, 2006). If we look at the factors that are common to the origin of FDI from the 
major Latin American countries since the beginning of the last decade, the first reason to put 
forward is the wish to find markets for their raw materials but also to diversify their sources 
of supply (CEPAL, 2006). Similarly, the macroeconomic instability, characterised in 
particular by considerable fluctuations in domestic demand and interest rate volatility, pushed 
companies to invest abroad in order to diversify their risks (Goldstein, 2007). Lastly, 
deregulation and privatisation policies played an identical role by intensifying 
competitiveness and also facilitating access to foreign competencies, hence the build-up of 
additional advantages in launching out to conquer foreign markets.  
Furthermore, macroeconomic factors have played a predominant role, particularly in relation 
to the transformations the countries in the region have undergone since the beginning of the 
1980s. After the “Lost Decade” of the Eighties, marked by a fall in the standard of living in 
several economies, the Nineties saw Latin America, influenced by international financial 
organisations, implement adjustment policies enabling higher growth rates to be achieved. 
The first few years of the new century coincided with an acceleration in growth, albeit still 
lower than in Asia, but nonetheless higher than that recorded in the other regions of the world. 
This improvement in “macroeconomic fundamentals”
4 (rise in growth rate, drop in inflation, a 
healthier current account balance) have undoubtedly served to attract foreign investors 
(Minda, 2007), but it has equally encouraged outward FDI flows, particularly due to the gains 
in corporate profitability and the increase in  foreign exchange reserves. 
It is worth noting that public companies have also played by no means an insignificant role in 
the expansion of Latin American FDI, even if government policies to promote these 
investments have been less dynamic than in Asia. In fact, Asian country leaders have not 
hesitated to use the weapon of foreign exchange rates, to hand out financial aid and to create 
specialised bodies to promote the international expansion of their own companies. Over and 
above these common factors, the internationalisation of Latin American corporations has also 
been influenced by the specific features of their country of origin. Hence, Brazilian   
multilatinas wanted to strengthen their presence abroad to reduce the impact of the réal’s 
volatility on the competitiveness of their exports and to achieve a more even balance between 
their inflows and outflows of both local and foreign currency (CEPAL, 2006). The limited 
availabilities of raw materials, notably in the domain of hydrocarbons, have encouraged a 
corporation such as Petrobras to multiply set-ups or partnerships in neighbouring countries. 
The structural reforms of the Nineties (liberalisation of trade, deregulation, privatisations) and 
the persistency of macroeconomic problems in creating respectively new conditions of 
                                                 
3 While most of the Latin American countries fall within the 2
nd or 3
rd stages of the IDP model, surely Brazil and 
Mexico are now moving into stage 4 ? 
4 The structural adjustment policies have nonetheless carved out inequalities within the population (Salama, 
2006)  
 The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
  - - 13 - -
competition and stagnation in the domestic market encouraged Brazilian corporations to look 
for new opportunities abroad in order to lessen the risks on their home market. The 
acquisition of foreign assets also opened up the occasional option for securing better sources 
of financing.  
In Mexico, the free-trade agreement signed in 1994 with the United States and Canada, the 
commercial agreements with the European Union (1999) and Japan (2004) and the economic 
reforms (services deregulation and privatisations) forced the major Mexican companies to 
develop more aggressive strategies to counter the arrival of foreign MNCs on their own 
domestic market. The other outward-looking impetus was provided by the fact that markets 
such as mobile phones, cement, foods and drinks were showing signs of saturation. The 
increasing pressures in competition drove some multilatinas to internationalise their 
competitive advantages (GPS technology from CEMEX, distribution systems from Gruma 
and Bimbo, homogeneous mobile telephony network from América Móvil) in order to win 
over new markets and strengthen their existing export markets (CEPAL, 2006). 
In Argentina, the need to build up and diversify their reserves led the oil companies YFF and 
Pérez Companc
5 to mount outward investments in order to access new natural resources. In 
Chile, the narrowness of the domestic market prompted Chilean companies to turn their focus 
more on foreign markets (Chudnovsky and López, 2000). Here, the earlier economic reforms, 
the specific advantages held by some companies in sectors such as telecommunications, 
energy, trading, together with natural competitive advantages (cellulose, paper, ores) also 
played a driving role in the internationalisation of local corporations. 
C - Host country attractivity factors  
If push factors have played a critical role in the expansion of Latin American MNCs, those 
same corporations have also directed their outward investments in light of the conditions 
prevailing in the countries likely to play host to them (pull factors). In particular, they have 
sought to seize acquisition opportunities or to acquire holdings resulting from the deregulation 
and privatisation programmes implemented in neighbouring countries. The presence of 
populations of Hispanic origin, particularly in the United States, and the improvement in 
distribution systems have also played their part in attracting Latin American MNCs. This is 
also true for the regionalisation of national brands, characterised by tie-ups with other MNCs, 
particularly in the foods and drinks sector, and the preferential access to the markets of 
countries that were signatories of bilateral or regional integration agreements (ALENA, 
Mercosur).  
In addition to these common factors of attraction, MNCs from the major Latin American 
investor countries sometimes had specific reasons for investing in a given country. Given the 
privileged economic relations between Brazil and Argentina, Brazilian MNCs seized the 
opportunities resulting from the Argentinian government’s privatisation programmes or from 
the economic crisis at the end of the 1990s (the acquisition of Pérez Companc by Petrobras). 
Some companies did not hesitate in following their customers into other regions (automobile 
parts). The protection measures taken in sectors such as steel and drinks, notably in the United 
States, provided the incitement for Brazilian MNCs to invest in the USA directly so as to get 
round barriers of this nature. The absence of bilateral commercial agreements with countries 
which represented meaningful outlets for Brazilian exports, especially the United States, 
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served as a stimulus for investments in these countries, or in bordering countries so as to use 
them as export platforms.  
The Mexican multilatinas took advantage of the free-trade agreement with Canada and the 
United States to bolster their presence there, all the more so in that the USA received a 
substantial influx of Mexican immigrants. There are estimated to be some 11 million Mexican 
migrants, born in Mexico and now living in the United States. In the last ten-yearly census 
carried out in 2000, the results showed that there were 20.6 million Mexicans and Americans 
of Mexican origin, the equivalent of 58.5% of the “Hispanic” grouping. Mexican MNCs were 
also attracted by the possibility of finding new foreign partners with whom they could seek to 
capture new foreign markets. Alliances with other MNCs was a technique often employed by 
companies such as América Móvil, Gruma, San Luis Rassini and Mabe. 
As well as the opportunities created by deregulations, privatisations and the search for new 
markets, the Argentinian multilatinas such as Quimes in Uruguay and Paraguay and Techint 
in Italy sought to turn both geographical and cultural proximity to their advantage. The 
shortage of natural resources forced YPF and Pérez Companc to seek out countries with 
reserves. Techint and Impsa used the host countries’ potential to transform their subsidiaries 
into export platforms aimed at peripheral markets to be captured. The Mercosur agreement 
with its commercial preferences was also an important attractivity factor. Conversely, the 
policies implemented by host countries to promote investments abroad played a secondary 
role (CEPAL, 2006).  
The Chilean multilatinas were conscious of the growth potential and market access offered by 
neighbouring countries, especially Argentina, Peru, Brazil and Colombia. The objective of 
some companies, CMPC, Lan Airlines, Falabella for example, was to transform their national 
brands into regional brands. Others, such as ENAP and Masisa, were looking to enhance their 
logistics and distribution systems. As in Mexico, some companies like ENAP, CCU, 
Embolladora Andina were aiming to form alliances with other foreign companies.  
III – The strategic behavioural patterns of the multilatinas 
A - Prioritisation in the search for market openings and natural 
resources 
As we have just shown, FDI determinants are closely linked to the decisions of MNCs whose 
investment in a given country depends on their overall strategy. While the strategies of MNCs 
are diverse, they can be grouped on the basis of the typology put forward by Dunning (1993) 
into four major categories: market-seeking, resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and created 
asset-seeking. 
Market-seeking, which sets out to widen business openings, is by far the most commonly 
employed strategy among developing country MNCs, including in Latin America. Indeed, 
winning foreign markets is the prime motivation pushing Latin American MNCs to invest 
abroad, even if, as we shall see later on, they privilege neighbouring countries or the rest of 
the sub-continent. Nevertheless, the example of the foods sector shows that MNCs do not 
hesitate in their search to win over other continents once they have consolidated their position 
in Latin America. Hence, the Mexican corporations Bimbo and Gruma which had set up 
business in the United States, more often than not through acquisitions, at the same time 
strengthened their presence in the rest of the region, mainly to satisfy the demand of Mexican The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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immigrants. They then began to position themselves on the European market and more 
recently in China and Japan to meet the growing demand for Mexican foodstuffs such as 
galletas and tortillas. 
Resource-seeking constitutes the second most important reason for multilatinas to invest 
abroad. In the hydrocarbons sector, the shortfall in resources in their home country has for 
example led corporations such as YPF and Pérez Companc in Argentina, Petrobras in Brazil 
and ENAP in Chile to launch an initial phase of exploration and production investment in 
Latin America as well as in Asia, Europe and the Middle East. These same companies are 
going to embark on a second phase by seeking out markets, especially in neighbouring 
countries, where they can invest in refining, distribution and marketing activities. On the other 
hand, PDVSA which possesses significant reserves in Venezuela has started by launching its 
refining and marketing operations mainly in the United States and in Europe, so as to sell off 
its locally produced production. 
Even if efficiency-seeking, the aim of which is principally to reduce production costs, appears 
to be a less important driving force compared to the strategies of Asian MNCs, some Latin 
American MNCs have recently conducted outward investment, including outside Latin 
America in order to benefit from lower production costs, while in some cases getting closer to 
their main markets abroad. This is the case with Nemak, a subsidiary of the Mexican 
conglomerate Alpha and now world leader in high-tech aluminium cylinder heads and blocks 
for car engines, which recently set up in China and Eastern Europe to get closer to the 
European and Asian markets and to take advantage of the relative low level of labour costs.  
The last strategy is that of created asset-seeking, like the access to new technologies, 
particularly by means of merger and acquisition operations or by alliances with companies in 
developed countries. The strategic alliances between Embraer and European groups such as 
EADS, Dassault, Thales and Snecma have enabled the Brazilian aeronautics constructor to 
acquire a wealth of know-how with a view to securing military contracts (Golstein, 2002). 
However, whereas it represents the second most important driver for Chinese MNCs, after 
market-seeking (UNCTAD, 2006), this reason is put forward less frequently by the 
multilatinas. Miotti et al. (2001) show that Korean groups have occasionally resorted to FDI, 
primarily in the United States, to gain access to new technological resources in order to be 
able to implement their catch-up and innovation strategy. The reason the multilatinas have 
shown less interest in acquiring creative resources compared to Asian MNCs is partly due to 
their lower profile in R&D-intensive sectors such as electronics, IT, chemicals and transport 
equipment. 
Even though the Latin American MNCs have privileged market and resource-seeking, their 
strategies have not always been exclusive. In some cases they have been able to invest abroad 
for a variety of reasons or to modulate the reasons for their internationalisation over time. The 
example of Nemak referred to earlier shows that its establishment in China and in Eastern 
Europe was driven as much by cost reduction reasons as by the wish to break into new 
markets. Likewise, PDVSA recently slimmed down its structures in the United States only to 
bolster its presence in the rest of Latin America and also in China and India, both as regards 
exploration and production as well as refining and distribution.  The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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B - The diversity of spatial strategies  
If one takes into account the spatial dimension of their operations, MNCs can be classified 
into four categories: global, multi-regional, bi-regional and regional. For Andreff (2003a), 
what distinguishes global MNCs is their ability to combine the four previous strategies and to 
replace one by another at any moment in any given country. This aptitude is derived from the 
implementation of a flexible post-Fordist production process capable of being adjusted at any 
time in response to quantitative or qualitative variations in demand. As Levitt (1983) points 
out, this capacity enables them to have a global vision of markets and of the competition and 
no longer just a multi-domestic approach. This ability to offer high added-value, global 
products allows them to locate their subsidiaries in the countries where they are the most 
profitable and to coordinate their activities within an international value chain (Porter, 1986).  
The implementation of such a strategy which calls for the structuring of multiple resources 
(financial, technological, organisational, managerial) is the domain of merely a small number 
of MNCs. Rugman (2005) identifies only nine “global” corporations
6 which he defines as 
corporations achieving at least 20% of their sales in each of the three regions of the Triad 
(North America, European Union, Asia-Pacific), but without any one region exceeding 50%. 
All these corporations, with the exception of Flextronics International (Singapore), come from 
developed countries. Discounting Coca-Cola and LVMH, the seven other corporations 
concentrate their main activity in just three sectors: electronics, IT and office automation.   
While no Latin American corporation can claim global corporation status, two of them 
(Cemex and Embraer) aspire to becoming global players. Cemex, which we will analyse in 
greater detail in the next paragraph, is, together with Lafarge and Holcim, one of the three 
largest global operators in the cement market. Established in 1969 with a majority State 
holding, Embraer initially specialised in the production of aircraft for agricultural and military 
purposes and for passenger transport. Privatised in 1994 (with the State retaining 6.8% of the 
capital and foreign ownership being capped at 40%), the company pursued the international 
development it had initiated earlier (set-up in the United States in 1979 and in Europe in 
1988) by forming strategic alliances with European groups as well as establishing a joint-
venture assembly plant in China in 2004 in order to give itself a foothold in the Asian market. 
Within a decade, the Brazilian MNC has become the 4
th aeronautics constructor in the world 
and holds top position for commercial planes in the under 110 passenger capacity category. 
Together with CVRD it is the only Latin American MNC whose foreign business represents 
more than 90% of its turnover (table 6). 
The second category comprises the multi-regional MNCs which are present in Triad 
countries, less frequently on the five continents, but whose presence abroad suffers from 
being unevenly split over the various regions and whose market share on a global scale is 
relatively weak compared to the corporations who are world leaders in their market sector. 
Hence, PDVSA which is present in the United States, Europe and Asia is only ranked as the 
9
th oil company worldwide. By comparison, the turnover of Exxon Mobil (the number 1 oil 
company in the world) was nearly four times that of PDVSA in 2005. Petrobras (16
th oil 
company in the world) is also present in countries of the Triad, even if its turnover achieved 
                                                 
6 The nine global corporations in order of turnover (2001) are: IBM, Sony, Philips, Nokia, Intel, Canon, Coca-
Cola, Flextronics International and LVMH 
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abroad is relatively low (21.2 %) compared to that of PDVSA (54.8%) (table 6). Other multi-
regional MNCs such as CVRD, Gerdau Gruma, Bimbo, Techint, and Odebrecht are also 
established in developed countries, some of them having quite a significant degree of 
internationalisation. As Chudnovsky and López (2000) observe, these corporations embarked 
on acquisitions outside Latin America to counterbalance the risk of competitors entering their 
own domestic or regional markets but also to maintain their market share at a world level.  
 
Table 6. Foreign operations of the major multilatinas, 2004 
(Millions of dollars and percentage) 
 



















Petrobras  52  109  21,2  x  x x x  x     x  Multi-regional 
PDVSA  46  589  54,8 x x  x  x x x      Multi-regional 
Telmex  12  444  11,4  x  x         x  Bi-regional   
América 
Móvil 
11  962  47,5  x  x        x    Bi-regional 
CVRD  10  380  90,5 x x  x  x x x      Multi-regional   
FEMSA  8  341  21,1  x           x Regional 
Cemex 8  059  67,1 x x  x  x x x      Aspiring  global 
player 
Gerdau  6  973  49,1  x  x x      x    Multi-regional   
Bimbo  4  592  32,3  x  x x      x    Multi-regional 
Embraer 3  854 
 
92,3 x x  x  x x x      Aspiring  global 
player 
Imsa  3  291  49,4  x  x        x    Bi-regional   
Cintra  3  200  42,0  x          x    Regional 
Gruma  2  219  68,9  x  x x     x     Multi-regional 
 
* Calculated as a % of the turnover realised by subsidiaries outside their countries of origin 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) and corporate annual reports  
Bi-regional companies such as Telmex, América Móvil, Imsa launched their attacks on North 
America, principally the United States, because their market was showing signs of saturation 
and also because of the density of Hispanic immigrants, especially Mexicans. The regional 
companies, more numerous although less well-known, are those whose market remains within 
the confines of Latin America either because it still offers growth potential or because the 
companies have no competitive advantages to assert abroad. The Mexican company FEMSA 
for example, of which some 40% is controlled by Coca-Cola, concentrates its activities in the 
region because Latin America represents around 20% of global alcohol-free drink sales, with 
Mexico alone accounting for half of that. In volume terms, Mexico comes just behind the 
United States whereas Brazil and Argentina stand in 5
th and 15
th positions respectively. In the 
alcoholic drinks segment, Corona beers from the Mexican group Modelo, can pride 
themselves on possessing a world-renowned brand label, selling in more than 150 countries 
(Quenan and Santiso, 2006).  
C - Cemex: the germ of a global strategy? 
Since its first cement works opened in Mexico in 1906, Cemex has become one of the world’s 
leading producers of cement, ready-mixed concretes and aggregates. Today the group counts 
more than 50,000 employees and a presence in more than 50 countries. From the role of 
merely a local player to the world’s number 3 in the cement business, Cemex has developed The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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its regional then world presence by setting up or acquiring production units, then high profile 
companies in their respective countries.  
Its expansion has been built in several stages. From 1906 to 1990, the objective of Cemex was 
to affirm its leadership on its own local market. During the 1970s, the company broadened its 
operations to cover the whole of Mexico, at the same time bolstering its vertical integration by 
increasing its activities on the ready-mixed concrete market. At the end of the Eighties, it 
bought out two of its competitors on the Mexican market (Cementos Anáhuac and Empresas 
Tolteca) in order to strengthen its production capacities on the concrete market and to 
reinforce its export potential, especially towards the United States.  
During the 1990s, Cemex began its quest to conquer foreign markets. Its introduction to the 
Mexico stock exchange in 1976 and Wall Street in 1999 was the pledge of the growing level 
of confidence granted to Cemex by international financial players, thereby enabling the 
company to access the financing required to implement a solid growth strategy and 
culminating in more than fifteen or so major acquisitions since 1992. From being a Mexican 
company, Cemex was rapidly becoming a multi-regional corporation following the 
acquisition in 1992 of the two largest Spanish cement producers, then of Balcones, a cement 
factory in the United States. Its expansion has not ceased to progress over the last decade with 
acquisitions in the emerging countries of Latin American (Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic) of Asia (Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand), of the Middle East and 
North Africa.  
Its wish to diversify its geographical risks provided the incentive to establish itself in 
developed countries. In 2000, the company acquired Southdown Inc., the second American 
cement producer,   enabling it as a result to become the number one producer in North 
America and number 3 in the world. With the acquisition in 2005 of RMC, the British group, 
present in Europe and the United States, Cemex doubled its size to become a top-ranking 
player on European markets. As a result of this ambitious operation, Cemex reinforced its 
position among the major world cement producers, alongside Lafarge, Holcim, Heidelberg 
and Italcementi and moved into the number 1 slot for ready-mixed cement. This integration, 
unprecedented in its history, also permitted Cemex to position itself as a competitive player in 
each segment of the value chain: cement, aggregates and ready-mixed concrete. 
A further chapter in this external growth story was written in 2007 with the launch of a 
takeover bid for the Australian Rinker. If the bid goes through, it would constitute the largest 
ever takeover trasaction in the history of construction materials, with the new structure 
becoming the world leader in aggregates. This additional acquisition would enable Cemex to 
strengthen its position in the United States, where Rinker generates 80% of its sales. Rinker is 
also one of the top three sector players in Australia, a country where Cemex is not represented 
to date.  
This international development is the result of a strategy combining a global vision of the 
market with the conservation of the local specificities of each country. Each subsidiary’s 
human resources policy puts the accent on safety, on-going vocational training for the teams 
and career development coaching. This genuine corporate culture is articulated round the 
“Cemex Way” approach and based on a common data management platform whose objective 
is to strive towards industrial and commercial excellence by allowing all to share best 
practices and synergies in every domain (production, commercial, logistics, environment, 
back-office). Genuine continuous improvement programmes have been set up for all group 
activities using a benchmarking format and a system to identify best practices on an on-going The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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basis. The establishment of common values also favours exchanges between staff, job 
functions and countries, thereby facilitating the development and opportunities of 
international careers and the sharing of a strong corporate culture. 
IV - What lessons can be drawn from the expansion of Latin 
American multinational corporations? 
A - The multilatinas: a reflection of the strengths and weaknesses 
of Latin America’s productive specialisations?  
To a large extent, the sectorial and spatial orientation of the multilatinas reflects the 
productive and technological specialisation of Latin America which has progressively been 
built up over recent decades. Development strategy based on the import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) has been confronted by numerous restrictions: problem of technical 
competency and financial resources for local companies, technological and financial 
dependence when viewed from outside, limitation of  economies of scale given the 
narrowness of certain domestic markets, problem of industrial employment (qualification of 
labour). The slender opening towards the exterior engendered by the adoption of protectionist 
barriers was accompanied by a slight incentive to innovate and modernise production tools 
(Bethell, 2003). The dropping of the ISI model in the wake of the 1982 debt crisis and the 
implementation of a strategy to promote industrial exports brought with it a wave of 
commercial and financial liberalisation, privatisations, a liberalising of FDI and State 
divestiture measures (The Washington Consensus). 
Latin American firms were confronted head-on by the competition from MNCs from 
developed countries, particularly in the high technology sectors such as pharmaceuticals, 
chemicals and capital goods. In a second phase they also had to face the competition 
presented by Asian MNCs which began to steal market share in labour-intensive sectors such 
as clothing, footwear and furniture (Katz, 2001). In this latter scenario however, the 
corporations from South East and Eastern Asia rapidly moved their positioning into more 
technology-intensive segments such as IT, electric and electronic goods and 
telecommunications. These corporations benefited from the more premature orientation of 
their home country’s industrialisation strategy in broadening the range of their manufactured 
goods exports. In some cases they were able to take advantage of technology transfers 
conducted in partnership with MNCs from developed countries who were investing in their 
home regions. They also benefited from a more favourable environment: greater economic 
and political stability, higher rates of investment and savings, public sector subsidies for 
research and development, quantity and quality of human resources (De Gregorio and Lee, 
1999).  
Certainly, some multilatinas have succeeded in facing up to the new competition created by 
the globalisation process by specialising or intensifying their activities in manufactured 
products based on natural resources like cement, petrochemicals and pulp. (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Nevertheless, Latin America does suffer overall from a problem of competitiveness when 
compared with Asia. The rates of accumulation of physical and human capital are relatively 
lower, thereby generating a low productivity of production factors and less innovation 
capacity (Maloney and Perry, 2005). The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) calculated by 
the World Economic Forum provides some of the explanations for this structural handicap The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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which is plaguing Latin America
7. This index is calculated using the factors that are likely to 
impact a country’s productivity and competitiveness. The GCI consists of nine factors: 
institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, health and primary education, higher education 
and training, market efficiency, technological readiness, degree of business sophistication and 
lastly innovation (table 7). 
On the basis of the GCI, Chile is ranked as the top Latin American country for 2006-2007, 
coming 27
th in the total world ranking. For the authors of the World Economic Forum report, 
this competitiveness is principally explained by the solidity of the institutions, the absence of 
any major distortions within the markets and the reduction in public debt. The resources freed 
by the change in fiscal policy have made it easier to finance investments in health and 
education. Mexico, ranked 57
th, chalks up honourable scores in the areas of education and 
health, but also regarding FDI and technology transfers as a result of its NAFTA membership. 
However, just like the rest of Latin America, it suffers from the same weakness in its 
institutions.   
Brazil, which stood in 57
th position the previous year, has slipped back to 66
th place as a result 
of the structural problems affecting its education system (access inequalities between social 
classes and religions, high drop-out rate) and its macroeconomic performances marked by 
insufficient control over its public finances. The weight of public debt is keeping interest rates 
high, thereby penalising the financing of investments and consumption by bank lending. As 
regards the institutions, Brazil scores particularly badly (114
th out of 125) due to the 
shortcomings and excessive bureaucracy of its public institutions. Argentina comes in three 
places behind Brazil given that it scored less well as regards fiscal discipline, inflation, the 
inefficiency of certain markets but especially due to the bad functioning of its institutions 
(118
th out of 125). This institutional weakness is particularly marked in the following areas: 
environment governing property rights, independence of the justice system, wastage of public 
resources and corruption. 
 
Table 7. Global competitiveness index, 2006-2007 
 
Overall index  Subindexes 
 




Rank Score Rank Score Rank  Score 
 
Singapore  5  5,63  2 6,13 3 5,63  15  5,11 
Taiwan  13  5,41  21 5,50 14 5,36  9  5,38 
Republic of Korea  24  5,13  22  5,47  25  5,00  20  4,96 
Chile  27  4,85  28 5,35 31 4,58 33  4,22 
India  43  4,44  60 4,51 41 4,32 26  4,60 
China  54  4,24  44 4,80 71 3,66 57  3,75 
Mexico  58  4,18  53 4,61 53 3,91 52  3,80 
Brazil  66  4,03  87 4,14 57 3,94 38  4,09 
Argentina  69  4,01  67 4,42 66 3,79 79  3,44 
 
* Institutions, infrastructure, macroeconomy, health and primary education 
** Higher education and training, market efficiency (goods, labor, financial), technological readiness 
*** Business sophistication, innovation 
                                                 
7 The downside of this indicator is that it only ranks countries according to criteria linked to business 
competitiveness and the business environment. As a result, it fails to take account of the human dimension of the 
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Source: World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2006-2007 
With the exception of Chile, the other emerging Latin American economies suffer from a lack 
of quality in their public institutions. Yet the competitiveness of an economy and its 
companies also relies on the complementarity of the policies conducted in the fields of 
education, science, technology and investment. The success of certain Asian countries is the 
result of coherent and targeted governmental policies aimed at strengthening the overall 
framework of innovation and the influx of knowledge. To a certain extent, the public 
authorities have endeavoured to attract techniques, know-how, personnel and capital from 
abroad. At the same time they have gone ahead with strategic investments in human 
resources, notably by encouraging the training of scientists and engineers. They have invested 
in the development of the infrastructures for research and development (science parks, public 
laboratories, business incubators, etc.) while at the same time pursuing strategies to protect 
intellectual property rights. As a result, the absence of industrial, education, research and 
development policies comparable to those that have been implemented in the emerging Asian 
economies are the reasons behind the lower proportion of FDI from Latin American 
corporations in the high-tech industries (Chudnovsky and López, 2000). 
B - Emerging multinational corporations and the re-establishment 
of North-South links 
Even if, taken as a whole, the multilatinas are still relatively small in size and their presence 
in terms of countries and geographical areas significantly inferior to that of developed 
countries’ MNCs, it is still a fact that the growth of their international activities which is 
advancing alongside the expansion of MNCs from the emerging Asian economies is not 
without consequence on the dynamics of the global economy, particularly on the development 
of North-South relations.  
The example of the multilatinas, and more especially of the Asian MNCs show that the 
Northern countries represent destinations which are important for their international 
investments. The search for openings and specific advantages encourage them to form 
partnerships or to acquire rival companies in developed countries and which possess 
substantial market share and reputed brand names. As Aykut and Goldstein (2006) point out, 
Chinese corporations such as Lenovo, TCL which previously owned no internationally 
recognised brand names have acquired the Thomson, RCA and IBM labels. Similarly, the 
purchase of Marionnaud by the A.S. Watson Group, a subsidiary of Hutchinson Whampoa 
(the top developing country MNC) followed the same logic with the added advantage of 
acquiring a distribution network. 
The strategies implemented by several emerging MNCs aim to find a balance between 
market-seeking on the one hand, and partnerships to acquire specific assets, particularly 
technological, on the other. The success of such strategies will lie in their ability to control the 
whole of a process stretching from conception through to realisation, or to join forces on 
strategic segments, by developing specific assets. In the case of India, this wager is on the 
brink of success for the IT sector, and is likely to be confirmed for part of the pharmaceutical 
biotechnologies and for some segments of the automobile industry.   
Emerging MNCs contribute in their own way to the implementation of a new principle of 
division of labour based on the knowledge economy. As Moati and Mouhoud (1994) suggest, 
the Taylorist division of labour theory is losing ground to a cognitive division of labour. 
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concentrated on blocks of knowledge and that they adopt organisational methods which aim 
to maximise their learning capacity. It therefore follows that corporations are more intent on 
seeking out an environment which favours their learning capacity than more advantageous 
cost conditions. However, the creation of cognitive resources is no longer the prerogative of 
Northern country corporations. For example, the Argentinian corporation Tenaris which has 
just bought in succession the American corporations Maverick Tube and Hydril is the number 
1 producer of tubes used in the drilling and extraction of oil and natural gas. Embraer is the 
world leader in the construction of regional transport aircraft, ahead of Bombardier and 
Dassault. Televisa (Mexico) is the leading Spanish language communications group in the 
world.  
C - Latin American multinationals and the strengthening of South-
South co-operation  
As figure 3 shows, South-South FDI, with the exclusion of offshore financial centres, are 
mainly conducted on an intraregional basis. According to UNCTAD estimates, the annual 
flows between Asian countries over the period 2002-2004 totalled an average of 47.8 billion 
dollars, representing 85.6% of total flows between developing countries (UNCTAD, 2006). 
Over the same period, the average annual flows between Latin American countries stood at 
2.7 billion, a figure which was considerably higher than the intraregional flows in Africa 
which, for the most part originate from South Africa. At the interregional level, South-South 
FDI movements, in order of importance, were first from Asia towards Africa, then from Latin 
America towards Asia and thirdly from Africa towards Asia. Contrary to what one might 
think, Asia’s outward FDI towards Latin America is quite modest and that between Latin 
America and Africa very low. On a sectorial level, South-South flows are strongly 
concentrated in the extraction of natural resources and associated services due to the 
progressive liberalisation in the areas of origin and the privatisation programmes in the 
recipient areas.   
Over and above the actual flow volumes, under certain conditions the multilatinas can 
represent an additional vehicle in driving economic cooperation between developing 
countries. The impacts of their investments are sometimes more beneficial than those caused 
by developed countries. This is particularly so in the case of regional corporations whose 
technological and operating model corresponds to that of corporations in the host country. 
The cultural proximity that is particularly apparent in relatively similar management methods 
works in favour of technological absorption capacities. This same adoption capacity can be 
facilitated when there is little technological divergence between foreign and domestic 
corporations, a facet which is more often the case as regards South-South FDI flows (Durham, 
2004). Furthermore, while some multilatinas may employ production techniques that are less 
capitalistic than those of MNCs from developed countries, it is quite conceivable that the 
former create more jobs than the letter, even though there are no detailed studies to provide 
conclusive evidence to support this.  The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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Figure 3. Intraregional and interregional FDI flows in developing countries, 
excluding offshore financial centres, average 2002-2004 (Millions of dollars) 
 
Source: Compiled by the author from UNCTAD data (2006) 
The FDI made by the multilatinas  and more generally by emerging MNCs represent an 
opportunity for LDCs (less developed countries). Except for the extraction of natural 
resources, MNCs from the North are less inclined to invest in small-scale economies and 
prefer to locate their investments in more substantial markets (Levy-Yeyati et al., 2003). Yet, 
developing countries’ FDI can represent up to 40% of total inward FDI in a lot of LDCs 
(UNCTAD, 2006). South-South FDI flows can also make up for the relative or temporary 
drop in FDI from countries of the North destined for developing countries. Aykut and 
Goldstein (2006) show that the collapse of North-South FDI caused by the Argentinian crisis 
prompted asset buying by Brazilian investors (cf. the acquisition of Quimes by Brahma, later 
to become AmBev, of Pérez Companc by Petrobras, of Acindar by Belgo Mineira, of Loma 
Negra by Camargo Correa).  
FDI by Southern countries does however entail new risks. Prospection and extraction 
activities in the hydrocarbons sector can be a source of tension if they are not sufficiently well 
organised or if they are conducted by foreign public companies, as is the case for PDVSA, 
Petrobras and ENAP. Among the tensions aroused, one can mention safety and corporate 
governance issues. Moreover, a lot of cross-border mergers and acquisitions made by Latin 
American corporations provoke the same concerns in terms of employment as when they are 
made by other MNCs.  
The strengthening of South-South cooperation through the FDI of the multilatinas can 
generate risks of instability in the scenario where the parent company decides to close down a 
subsidiary. The increase in FDI flows between developing countries and the enhanced 
economic integration it prompts can be a double-edged sword in the sense that economic 
crises can be more easily contagious from one country to another (Aykut and Goldstein, 
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coming from developing countries and eventually to their higher or lower degree of 
concentration in any one sector.   
Conclusions 
With the exception of Cemex and Embraer which aspire to be global players, most of the 
multilatinas are corporations with a regional vocation. Their principal motivation lies in the 
acquisition of natural resources and the search for market openings. This spatial strategy 
together with their sectorial focus, partly reflect the productive and technological 
specialisation of the emerging Latin American economies. Indeed, the multilatinas do not 
enjoy the same specific advantages as the emerging Asian multinational corporations in high-
tech industries or in high capital-intensive sectors. This handicap is partly rooted in the initial 
mode of industrial development, the relatively low rate of accumulation of physical and 
human capital, but also the lack of ambition and resources on the part of public policies, 
particularly in industry, education, research and development. All these elements generate a 
low level of productivity of the factors of production and a lesser capacity for innovation. 
Despite this handicap, the development of the multilatinas is not without consequence on the 
dynamics of the global economy. Together with the other emerging MNCs they are 
contributing to the re-establishment of North-South links and the strengthening of South-
South co-operation. To better define the issues at stake in their expansion, further in-depth 
work would be needed to supplement the research that has already been devoted to them. At 
the macroeconomic level, not enough is yet known about the impact of the multilatinas on 
their own country, nor on the countries where their subsidiaries set up, particularly in terms of 
balance of payments, technology transfers and employment. At the microeconomic level, it 
would be interesting to perform a more detailed analysis of their mode of governance and the 
financing mechanisms they employ when setting up abroad. At the global level, one would 
need a better understanding of the relations they maintain with the MNCs from developed 
countries (competition and/or co-operation?). These avenues for research, which are not 
exhaustive, could bear more fruit if they were conducted from the starting point of a 
comparative analysis in terms of the MNCs’ sectors of activity and countries of origin 
(OECD, emerging economies of Asia, Latin America and Africa). These comparisons would 
have the merit of enlightening us as to the greater or lesser degree of specificity displayed by 
the multinationals originating from emerging countries.  The strategies of multilatinas: from the quest for regional leadership to the myth of the global corporation 
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